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STATEMENT REGARDING DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and
regulations that are of central importance to the issues presented for review.
STATEMENT OF CERTIFIED QUESTION
Under Utah preclusion law, is the Utah Supreme Court's discretionary
review of a petition for extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches
grounds a decision "on the merits" when it is accompanied by a written opinion,
such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case presents the issue of whether plaintiff, an unincorporated
association of Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
members (hereinafter "FLDS Association"), can relitigate the virtually identical
claims that this Court expressly held barred by laches in Fundamentalist Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054.
This case arises out of the Utah probate court's reformation of the United

,

Effort Plan Trust ("the Trust"). The Utah probate court (Lindberg, J.) began
supervising the Trust more than six years ago after the trustees abandoned the
i

Trust rather than defend allegations that Warren Jeffs, the President of the
Corporation of the President of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of
i

Latter-Day Saints, Inc. ("COP") and presiding trustee of the Trust, had engaged in
1
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extreme misconduct, including allegations of child sexual abuse. Rather than
appeal the state probate court's final reformation judgment, the FLDS Association
waited nearly three years before collaterally attacking it, both by filing a §1983
lawsuit in federal district court and subsequently seeking virtually identical relief
in a petition for extraordinary writ in this Court.
After the FLDS Association agreed to stay the federal court action and
proceed first with the petition for extraordinary writ, this Court held the FLDS
Association's constitutional challenge to the reformation of the Trust barred by
laches. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054. The Court explained:
[M]any individuals have relied upon the district court's final order
from over three years ago, and the FLDS Association has given no
adequate explanation for its delay in appealing or otherwise
petitioning for relief The FLDS Association has shown a lack of
diligence in challenging the modification of the Trust, and this lack of
diligence has operated to the detriment of others. The FLDS
Association offers no adequate explanation for its delay and no other
circumstances exist that might make us otherwise hesitant to apply
laches.

Notwithstanding this Court's thorough examination of the issues and
detailed factual and legal findings, and notwithstanding the requirements of the
federal "Full Faith and Credit" statute, 28 U.S.C. §1738, the district court
concluded that res judicata does not apply because this Court did not pay sufficient
attention to the "merits" of the FLDS Association's claim in its Lindberg decision.
2
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Appellants' Appendix ("Aplt.App.") 62-64. Instead of dismissing the association's
attempt to relitigate claims this Court had concluded could not proceed, the district
court held that the First Amendment prohibited the Utah probate court from
applying Utah law to reform the Trust to protect its intended beneficiaries. To
remedy the alleged constitutional violation, the district court issued a preliminary
injunction staying all proceedings in the probate court, suspending the Special
Fiduciary, and transferring control of the Trust's substantial assets to Jeffs (as
President of the COP), the very individual whose improper conduct necessitated
the probate action in the first instance.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stayed the district court's extraordinary
injunction and, subsequently, certified to this Court the question whether "[u]nder
Utah preclusion law . . . the Utah Supreme Court's discretionary review of a
petition for extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches grounds [is] a
decision 'on the merits' when it is accompanied by a written opinion, such that
later adjudication of the same claim is barred."

Order Certifying State Law

Questions at 8, Doc. No. 01018803969 (10th Cir. Mar. 2, 2012). This Court
should answer that question in the affirmative and confirm that its prior decision in
Lindberg was "on the merits" for purposes of claim and issue preclusion.

3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
To put this case into context, we discuss the background of the Trust, Jeffs'
breach of fiduciary duty and abuse of the Trust, the ensuing probate action to
protect the Trust, and the related federal and state proceedings concerning the
FLDS Association's collateral attacks on the reformation of the Trust.
Background on the UEP Trust, The Trust was created in 1942 by
members of the "Priesthood Work" association. Aplt.App.25, 1221. Through the
years, numerous people donated land to the Trust and made improvements on Trust
land. Aplt.App.2007. Today, the Trust property consists almost entirely of land
and improvements, including over 5,000 acres and 700 homes located in Hildale,
Utah; Colorado City, Arizona; and British Columbia, Canada. Aplt.App.26, 57815783.
Disputes began to arise about what property rights, if any, individuals who
contributed property and/or improvements to the Trust enjoyed.

See Jeffs v.

Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998). In the 1990s, while such litigation was
pending, Rulon Jeffs organized a church for his followers (the "FLDS Church"),
formed the COP under the Utah Corporation Sole statute, Utah Code Ann. §16-7-6,
and designated himself as president of the FLDS Church and "Corporate Sole" of
the COP, thus giving himself the power to conduct all church legal affairs. See
Articles of Incorporation, dated February 6, 1991, filed with the Utah Dep't of

4
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Commerce, https://secure.utah.gov/bes/action; see also Aplt.App.25, 241, 245,
5593.
After this Court held that the Trust was a private trust, Jeffs, 970 P.2d at
1253, Rulon Jeffs and other trustees in 1998 executed an amended Trust (the
"1998 Restatement") that purported to convert the Trust to a charitable trust with
the "religious purpose" of providing "for Church members according to their
wants and their needs, insofar as their wants are just ...."

Aplt.App.243.

Apparently intending to eliminate the rights granted private beneficiaries in Stubbs,
the 1998 Restatement declared that a person who is deemed uncommitted to the
FLDS Church may be removed from Trust property without returning any property
that person provided to the Trust. Id. The 1998 Restatement further stated that the
Trust was to be "of perpetual duration," but, in the event of termination, the Trust
assets would become property of the COP. Aplt.App.244.
In 2002, Rulon Jeffs died and his son, Warren Jeffs, became Corporate Sole
of the COP and president of the Board of Trustees of the Trust. Aplt.App.28.
Abuse of the Trust. There is substantial evidence that while serving as
trustee, Warren Jeffs engaged in illegal conduct (polygamy and sexual activity
with children) and caused his followers to engage in similar unlawful conduct by
commanding and performing "marriages" of young girls to older men who were
4

5
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already married.1 E.g., Aplt.App. 1981-1983, 3127-3149. Evidence also shows
that the Trust was used as a means of punishing those who refused Jeffs' demands
to engage in illegal conduct.

E.g., Aplt.App.5594.

Indeed, a court found that

Jeffs tried to evict a family from its home on Trust land within ten minutes after
the mother refused to comply with Jeffs' demand that her 15-year-old daughter
"marry" an already-married 39-year-old man. See United Effort Plan Trust v.
Holm, 101 P.3d 641, 643 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
Breach of Fiduciary Duties/Abandonment of the Trust. In 2004, the
Trust, the FLDS Church, and Jeffs were named co-defendants in two tort lawsuits
(the "Tort Lawsuits") brought by individuals (the "Tort Plaintiffs") seeking large
awards based on allegations that Jeffs used the Trust to coerce illegal activity.
Aplt.App.28, 3623-3673. Jeffs subsequently transferred much of the Trust's
valuable non-residential property to entities that he controlled, which gave rise to
claims for fraudulent transfer. Aplt.App.5159-5190, 5256-5269.

Jeffs also

gathered and hid the Trust's records. Aplt.App. 1984-1985.

Furthermore, this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that Warren Jeffs was
convicted by a jury in Texas for aggravated sexual assault of a child and sexual
assault of a child in violation of Texas Penal Code Ann. §§22.011, 22.021, and was
sentenced to "confinement for life and twenty years, respectively . . . ." Jeffs v.
State, No. 03-11-00568-CR, 2012 WL 1068797, at *1 (Texas App. Mar. 29, 2012)
(dismissing Jeffs' appeal for want of prosecution).
6
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Jeffs and the other trustees failed to defend the Trust in the Tort Lawsuits.
Aplt.App.28. This was a conscious decision by Jeffs, who forbade his followers
from becoming involved in the Tort Lawsuits with the instruction: "Answer them
nothing and don't give them any testimony or witness." Aplt.App.28? 1990.
Failure to defend the Trust exposed it to default judgments and placed the
homes of the people residing upon Trust property at risk. Aplt.App.29, 1093-1095.
Rodney Parker and the law firm of Snow Christensen & Martineau (attorneys for
the COP and the Trust) withdrew as counsel and filed motions in the Tort Lawsuits
stating that: (1) no court had ruled on the character of the 1998 Restatement; (2)
occupants of the Trust's lands may have enforceable interests in the property of the
Trust; (3) those who lived on Trust property should be given notice, advised to
obtain counsel, and given an opportunity to protect their interests; and (4) the state
Attorney General should be notified if the Trust is deemed to be a charitable trust.
Aplt.App.614-625, 2003-2010.
The Probate Action. After receiving notice of the trustees' breach, the
Utah Attorney General on May 26, 2005, filed a petition initiating an in rem
probate action (the "Probate Action") in the Third District Court of Salt Lake
County, Utah (the "probate court") pursuant to the Utah Uniform Trust Code (Utah
Code Ann. §75-7-101 et seq.).

Aplt.App.565-583.

The petition requested

multiple remedies, including removal of the trustees, the appointment of a special
7
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fiduciary to administer the Trust, and, if the court deemed it necessary, the
reformation of the Trust at the request of an interested party. Aplt.App.582-583.
As much of the Trust's property and beneficiaries are located in Arizona,
Aplt.App.5782, the Arizona Attorney General also appeared in the Probate Action
in support of the petition, Aplt.App.l 183-1191, 5847.
Some individual beneficiaries of the Trust (the "Private Beneficiaries") also
filed a petition in the Probate Action alleging that the Trust was a private trust and
seeking remedies identical to those sought by the Attorneys General.
Aplt.App.5198-5217. The Tort Plaintiffs likewise appeared in the Probate Action,
asserting that the Trust was private and reserving the right to challenge the validity
of the 1998 Restatement. Aplt.App.5218-5244.
Notice of the Probate Action was served in compliance with Utah Code Ann.
§75-1-401, including service upon the defaulting trustees and the COP and service
by publication on persons believed to assert interests in the assets of the Trust. See
Aplt.App.5295-5296, 5302-5304, 5324-5431, 5385-5431, 5438-5448, 5450-5504,
5696-5697. Notice was also published in newspapers in states where interested
persons were known to be living or conducting activities on Trust property.
Aplt.App.5465-5470, 5482-5504, 5696-97.

Notice was served upon Rodney

Parker (COP's registered agent) from the beginning of the Probate Action,

8
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Aplt.App.5302-5304, 5438, and continually thereafter because Parker filed a
request to remain on the official service list, Aplt.App.5904.
After service of notice of the Probate Action, and having received no
opposition, the probate court (Himonas, J.) suspended the trustees and appointed
Bruce Wisan as a Special Fiduciary on June 22, 2005. Aplt.App.5449, 790-798.
The Probate Action was subsequently re-assigned to Judge Lindberg, who invited
input from all interested persons and defined a broad class of people who would
have standing to propose new trustees, including the COP, the trustees, and all
beneficiaries of the Trust (broadly defined as anybody who had donated property,
time, talents, or resources). Aplt.App.5473.
The FLDS Association's members knowingly refused to participate in the
Probate Action. Aplt.App.28-30. Jeffs told his followers that the Judge and the
Special Fiduciary were "of the devil," and instructed them to "continue to answer

<

them nothing." Aplt.App.1994. Jeffs and the other suspended trustees also failed
to comply with the probate court's order to provide an accounting and turn over
assets and records.

Aplt.App.29, 5772.

Instead, Jeffs immediately arranged to

destroy many documents and to hide others in a vault in Texas. Aplt.App.2000<

2001.
2

Many interested persons appeared or otherwise communicated with the probate
court, but none objected to the suspension of the trustees or the appointment of the
Special Fiduciary. See, e.g., Aplt.App.5198, 5218, 5432, 5566, 5577-5602, 5698.
9
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i

Reformation of the Trust.

On December 13, 2005, the probate court

issued a 28-page Memorandum Decision addressing a number of significant issues
concerning the administration of the Trust. Aplt.App. 1567-1596. The court held
that the 1998 Restatement was the "operative" trust instrument, and it created a
charitable Trust. Aplt.App. 1572-1574, ffijlO-15. The court also found that the
suspended trustees "committed serious breaches of trust," Aplt.App.1576, f21,
demonstrated "unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure" to administer the
Trust, id, violated their duty of loyalty and the requirement of prudent
administration, id., failed to defend against the Tort Lawsuits, Aplt.App.1577,1J22,
and violated court orders requiring an accounting of current Trust administration,
id.
Because a "fundamental tenet of the COP involves the illegal practice of
polygamy," the probate court found that the Trust would "fail if its sole purpose
was to advance those illegal religious practices." Aplt.App.1581, ^[33 (emphasis in
original). The court concluded, however, that the "drafters would have preferred
that the Trust survive to accomplish its stated purpose of providing for the needs
and 'just wants' of its beneficiaries, rather than fail for want of a lawful purpose."
Aplt.App.5282, p 3 .

In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the Utah

"Code's broad intent to preserve charitable trusts whenever possible." Id.

10
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The probate court also found that allowing the Trust to fail and applying the
reversionary clause would place the Trust assets in Jeffs' hands despite his breach
of fiduciary duties and use of Trust assets for illegal purposes. Aplt.App.1589,
ffl[51-53. This result, the court found, would be "inequitable." Aplt.App.1590,
1(53 n.26.
Instead, the probate court invoked the atime-honored doctrine of cy pres"
which allows a court to modify a trust consistent with the settlor's charitable
purpose if "a particular charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable,
impossible to achieve or wasteful." Aplt.App.1575, ]fl9. The court then outlined a
framework to reform the Trust, guided by three legal principles: (1) preserving the
Trust's

general

charitable

purpose—"caring

for

needy

individuals,"

Aplt.App.1580, ]f31; (2) removing the Trust's illegal purposes—including
"polygamy, bigamy, [and] sexual activity between adults and minors,"
Aplt.App.1580, ffl|31, 33; and (3) employing "neutral principles of law" to avoid
entangling church and state, Aplt.App. 1582-1583, ^[35-37.
The probate court concluded by inviting "all interested parties to identify
any issues relative either to the analysis employed by the Court or the framework
discussed above." Aplt.App. 1594, ^[63; see also Applt.App.1580, f32 n.53. The
Special Fiduciary provided notice of the reformation process by mail to those who
appeared in the case. Aplt.App.6006-6008. The Special Fiduciary also mailed a
11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

written notice to each residence on Trust land informing the residents about the
Memorandum Decision and providing an Internet address where it could be
viewed. Aplt.App.5903, 2170. Thereafter, the Special Fiduciary sent a second
notice to each residence on Trust land discussing the Memorandum Decision and
the status of the Trust's planned reformation. Aplt.App.6003-6005.
Notwithstanding such notices, no member of the FLDS Association
appeared, provided input, or presented themselves as a possible trustee.
Aplt.App.30, 1593, f61 n.95. The Special Fiduciary, the Attorneys General, and
some members of the Trust's beneficiary class, however, cooperatively prepared a
proposed reformed trust declaration in accordance with the framework stated in the
Memorandum Decision. Aplt.App.5906-5920, 5925-5971.
On October 25, 2006, the probate court signed the Reformed Declaration of
Trust and an accompanying Order formally removing the trustees and certifying
the reformation as a final judgment (the "Reformation Judgment"). Aplt.App.83 8863, 865-872. No person filed an appeal or other opposition to the Reformation
Judgment. Aplt.App.5019-5020.
Reliance on the Reformed Trust. Numerous individuals acted in reliance
upon the validity and finality of the Reformation Judgment. The Tort Plaintiffs
settled their claims against the Trust for nominal damages, Aplt.App.4573, 46824692, and the Fiduciary dissuaded other claimants from pursuing legal claims
12
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against the Trust, Aplt.App.6096, 2176, presumably because Jeffs was no longer in
control.

Similarly, in light of the removal of Jeffs, the Private Beneficiary

Petitioners (and the Tort Plaintiffs) did not pursue their challenges to the 1998
Restatement. Aplt.App.5204, 5208-5209, 5219-5220, 5732, 5739. In addition,
other people relied upon the Reformation Judgment in entering into transactions
involving Trust property. See e.g., Aplt.App.2048, 2059, 4905-4907, 4919-4922,
4924-4942. (For a more detailed summary of actions taken in reliance upon the
Reformation Judgment, see Aplt.App. 1912-1914).
Collateral Attacks on the Final Reformation Judgment. In the latter half
of 2008, two years after entry of the Reformation Judgment, Jeffs and his followers
changed tactics.

While incarcerated, Jeffs instructed Willie Jessop to lead a

coalition of followers, retain legal counsel, and demand "protection of their rights,"
but to conceal Jeffs' role in the new litigation strategy so the "coalition" would
appear as a "group of individuals . . . without bringing in the authorities of the
Church." Aplt.App.1995-1996.
Following Jeffs' command, Willie Jessop, Merlin Jessop, and Dan Johnson
in 2008 filed a motion in the probate court to block the sale of certain Trust
property, which allegedly interfered with their religious practices. Aplt.App. 8 84885.3 The probate court rejected movants' challenge on several grounds, including
3

Members of the FLDS Association supported this motion. Aplt.App.4208-4567.
13
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that the Reformation Judgment was final and that their claims were barred by
laches. Aplt.App.874-889. The probate court also found that the movants lacked
standing. Aplt.App.885-886. The movants did not appeal this ruling.
The movants subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the probate action,
which was similarly denied for lack of standing because the probate court had
found the 1998 Restatement created a charitable trust, and beneficiaries do not
have standing to raise claims concerning the administration of a charitable trust.
Aplt.App.6216. The movants appealed that decision to this Court (Appeal No.
20090691), which appeal is presently stayed. See infra p. 20.
Plaintiff also collaterally attacked the Reformation Judgment by filing a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Case No.
2:08-cv-772DB (the "Federal Court Action"), Aplt.App.7, 469-502, and a
subsequent petition for extraordinary writ in the Utah Supreme Court, Case No.
20090859 (the "Extraordinary Writ Action"), Aplt.App.2717-2804.

Plaintiff

stayed the Federal Court Action while this Court acted on the Extraordinary Writ
Action. Aplt.App.1337-1339.
The Extraordinary Writ Action. The FLDS Association filed a petition
for an extraordinary writ pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In the petition,
the FLDS Association contended, inter alia, the reformation of the Trust violated
14
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the First Amendment. The parties filed extensive briefs and submitted over 200
exhibits, including declarations.

Consequently, this Court's file in this action

consisted of thousands of pages in multiple volumes.

In addition, this Court

received the entire record of the district court in the Probate Action through March
2010—which consisted of an additional 57 volumes.
On February 17, 2010, this Court heard lengthy oral argument on the FLDS
Association's constitutional claims and Appellants' laches defense. Thereafter, on
August 27, 2010, this Court entered its written Opinion holding that the FLDS
Association's claims were "barred" under the "equitable doctrine of laches." See
TAndberg, 2010 UT 57,1f43.
Specifically, the Court explained that laches is a "delay that works a
disadvantage to another," consisting of two legal elements: "(1) a party's lack of
diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence."

Id. ^27

(quotations omitted). With respect to the first factor, this Court found that the
FLDS Association's members were aware of the probate court's administration
and reformation of the Trust, that the probate court welcomed their participation in
the reformation proceedings, that the FLDS Association nevertheless waited three
years after the reformation of the Trust before filing its petition, and that the FLDS
Association did not explain why it waited so long or why its delay was reasonable.
Mf30.
15
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Based on these factual findings, this Court concluded:
Because of the three-year delay in the face of invitations by the
district court to participate, and because this delay did not occur
under circumstances that might excuse it, such as prompt
negotiations aimed at avoiding litigation, or under
circumstances that might make us otherwise hesitant to apply
the doctrine of laches, the FLDS Association has demonstrated
a lack of diligence in filing this petition.
Id.^32.
As to the second laches factor, this Court found that the FLDS Association's
lack of diligence caused injury to "numerous parties," id. ^|43, who relied upon the
reformation of the Trust, changed their positions, and made irreversible decisions
based upon the unappealed and unchallenged rulings of the district court, id. ffi[3335. For example, this Court found that the Special Fiduciary had entered into
transactions on the assumption of the validity of the reformed Trust that could not
be undone. Id. ^33. The Court also found prejudice to the Tort Plaintiffs, who
agreed to settle their lawsuits against the Trust only because of the reformation. Id.

P4.
The Court summarized its laches decision as follows:
In sum, many individuals have relied upon the district court's final
order from over three years ago, and the FLDS Association has given
no adequate explanation for its delay in appealing or otherwise
petitioning for relief. The FLDS Association has shown a lack of
diligence in challenging the modification of the Trust, and this lack of
diligence has operated to the detriment of others. The FLDS
Association offers no adequate explanation for its delay and no other
circumstances exist that might make us otherwise hesitant to apply
laches.
16
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M P5.4
The Federal Court Action. The FLDS Association did not seek review of
the Lindberg decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. Instead, the FLDS Association
renewed the Federal Court Action, which, as the federal district court recognized,
raised "virtually the same" claims raised in the Extraordinary Writ Action.
Aplt.App.34.

The defendants in the Federal Court Action raised numerous

defenses, including that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with a state
court's administration of a Utah trust and that the federal court was bound, under
the doctrine of res judicata, by this Court's finding that plaintiffs claims are barred
by laches. Aplt.App.49, 3209-3219.
The

federal

district

court

issued

a temporary

restraining

order,

Aplt.App.3203-3205, and requested further briefing on the question whether this
Court's laches decision in Lindberg was binding, Aplt.App.12 (Docket No. 87). In
the extensive briefing that followed, the FLDS Association agreed that, if the
Lindberg decision is "on the merits," then its claims must be dismissed.
Aplt.App.56. Plaintiff argued, however, that a dismissal of claims on grounds of

4

This Court further held that claims that arose "from facts that occurred after the
Trust was modified" were not barred by laches. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51,ffl[39,43.
None of those claims were ripe, however, because the allegedly unconstitutional
conduct had not occurred and was not imminent. Id. ^[41.
17
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laches is not a decision "on the merits" under Utah law, and therefore the Lindberg
decision is not preclusive in federal court. Id.
The Entry of the Preliminary Injunction. Without holding an evidentiary
hearing, the federal district court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on
February 24, 2011, granting the FLDS Association's motion for preliminary
injunction and denying the defendants' motions to dismiss. Aplt.App.22-69.
With respect to the issue of res judicata, the district court found that Utah
law is not settled on the question whether the dismissal of claims on laches
grounds is a decision "on the merits" that is entitled to preclusive effect.
Aplt.App.56. Although the court found that there is "no clear precedent from the
Utah Supreme Court or any other Utah state court" regarding the matter, id., it
declined to certify the question to this Court, as requested by the defendants.
Instead, the district court inferred that Utah would likely reject the majority view
and would adopt instead a two-tiered approach under which "laches is entitled to
preclusive effect in some cases, namely where there is some appropriate attention
paid to the merits, and not in others." Aplt.App.62. Because the district court
thought this Court in Lindberg did not pay appropriate attention to the merits of the
FLDS Association's underlying constitutional claims, it declined to accord that
decision preclusive effect. Aplt.App.56-64.
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The federal district court likewise denied the numerous jurisdictional and
procedural bars to injunctive relief advanced by the defendants, including the
probate exception to federal court jurisdiction, Younger abstention, and the defense
that plaintiffs complaint was barred by laches. Aplt.App.49-52. In contrast, the
court found that the probate court's reformation of the Trust likely violated the
First Amendment. Aplt.App.34-49.
On April 7, 2011, the court entered the preliminary injunction proposed by
the FLDS Association, which functionally invalidated the probate court's
reformation of the Trust and its administration over the Trust. Aplt.App.70-74.
The preliminary injunction order suspended the Special Fiduciary, enjoined
administration of the Reformed Trust, ordered the Special Fiduciary to turn over all
non-privileged Trust records to the COP, and ordered the Special Fiduciary to turn
over all Trust assets to the control of the COP. Id. The injunction allowed the
COP to administer the Trust property "according to its religious principles," while
adding several "additional terms and restrictions." Aplt.App.72-73.
Additional Briefing in the Utah Supreme Court. After the entry of the
federal court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, this Court entered an Order in
two related cases pending before it.5

Noting that the federal district court's

5

The first case, Appeal No. 20090691, is from the probate court's order denying
standing to certain FLDS leaders challenging the administration of the reformed
Trust. Aplt.App.4701. The second case, Appeal No. 20091006, is from the
19
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analysis of the laches issue "contradicts [the] decision in Lindberg" this Court
requested supplemental briefing "regarding the preclusive effect of our decision in
Lindberg and on the implications of that question in these cases." Aplt.App.47024703.
After receiving supplemental briefing and hearing oral argument on April
12, 2011, this Court on June 13, 2011 entered an order staying both appeals
pending the Tenth Circuit's ruling on the appeal of the federal district court's
preliminary injunction order.
The Tenth Circuit Court Stays the Preliminary Injunction.

The

defendants in the Federal Court Action appealed the preliminary injunction, and
Judge Lindberg filed an emergency motion asking to the Tenth Circuit to stay the
preliminary injunction pending appeal. Emergency Motion to Stay, Doc. No.
01018621127 (10th Cir. Apr. 13,2011). Judge Lindberg instructed the Fiduciary
not to turn over Trust documents or assets pending appellate review of the
preliminary injunction, but to minimize conflict with the federal court, she ordered
the Special Fiduciary not to initiate any affirmative action, other than as necessary
to protect the assets of the Trust Id. at Attachment E.

probate court's order disqualifying one of the FLDS Association's law firms,
which formerly represented the Trust, from representing parties in actions adverse
to the Trust. Aplt.App.4702-03.
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Thereafter, the federal district court ordered Judge Lindberg to show cause
why she should not be held in contempt. Aplt.App.4951-4952. He also threatened
to send U.S. Marshals to ensure her appearance. Notice of Information at 2,
Document No. 01018622162 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2011). On April 15, 2011, the
Tenth Circuit issued a Stay Order, temporarily staying both the Show Cause Order
and the Preliminary Injunction. Stay Order, Document No. 01018623246 (10th
Cir. Apr. 15, 2011). After additional briefing, the Tenth Circuit ordered that its
stay shall remain in effect until dissolved by that court.

Order, Doc. No.

01018630078 (10th Cir. Apr. 27, 2011). The stay of the Preliminary Injunction
Order has remained in place since that time, and the Trust remains under the
administration of the probate court and the Special Fiduciary.
The Tenth Circuit Certifies A State Law Question To The Utah
Supreme Court.

In addition to briefing the merits of the appeal, the

Appellants/Defendants filed motions asking the Tenth Circuit to certify to this
Court the question of the preclusive effect under Utah law of a judgment
dismissing claims on grounds of laches. See, e.g., Judge Lindberg and Special
Fiduciary Wisan's Motion to Certify, Doc. No. 01018686652 (10th Cir., Aug. 1,
2011); Utah Attorney Genera Shurtleffs
01018686494 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 2011).

21

Motion to Certify,

Doc. No.

The FLDS Association opposed
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certification.

Appellee's Mem. In Opp. to Motions to Certify, Doc. No.

01018736082 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2010).
On February 23, 2012, the Tenth Circuit granted the motions to certify and,
on March 2, 2012, issued a separate order explaining the reasons for granting the
motions and stating the specific state law question certified to this Court. On
March 16, 2012, this Court issued an order accepting the certification of the state
law question.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should confirm that under Utah law, dismissal of a petition for an
extraordinary writ on grounds of laches in a written opinion is a decision "on the
merits" such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred.
The doctrine of res judicata is " 'premised on the principle that a controversy
should be adjudicated only once.'" Mack v. Utah Dep 't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47,
1}29, 221 P.3d 194 (quoting Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, f23, 34
P.3d 180).

The doctrine is intended "to protect litigants from the burden of

relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and to promote
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407,
409 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, courts—including the Supreme
Court, Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190 (1947)—have recognized that a prior
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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adjudication does not need to reach the "ultimate substantive" merits in order to
qualify as a decision "on the merits" with preclusive effect.
including this Court, State v. Cahoon, 2009 UT 9, f l l ,

Thus, courts—

203 P.3d 957—have

repeatedly applied res judicata to hold that a dismissal of an action on statute of
limitations grounds precludes relitigation of the underlying substantive claim even
though the court did not reach the "merits" of the substantive claim.
Although

this

Court

has

not

directly

addressed

whether

laches

determinations should have preclusive effect, the logic of applying that doctrine to
dismissals on statute of limitations grounds compels extending it to the laches
context as well. A fortiori, if res judicata applies to the determination that a claim
should be barred because it is untimely, it should apply where there are express
judicial findings that the plaintiff unduly delayed the filing of its claim and
allowing that claim to proceed would cause substantial prejudice to parties that had
justifiably relied on the status quo. Indeed, allowing relitigation in such a context
would defeat the very purpose of the laches doctrine. Numerous courts have
reached the same conclusion, and it is hornbook law that "[t]he same rule [that
applies to statute of limitations dismissals] applies to a dismissal on such
analogous theories as laches or undue delay in initiating an administrative
proceeding." 18A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§4441 (2d ed. 2002).
23
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That this Court dismissed the FLDS Association's claims on laches grounds
in context of a petition pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
does not deprive the decision of preclusive effect. Although the decision whether
to grant relief on a Rule 65B petition is "left to the sound discretion of the court
hearing the petition," State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ^[23, 127 P.3d 682, it is "well
settled that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to judgments in mandamus and
prohibition proceedings[.]" E.T. Tsai, Annotation, Judgment Granting or Denying
Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition as Res Judicata, 21 A.L.R. 3d 206, §2 (1968).
Thus, in Gates v. Taylor, 2000 UT 33, ffi[l-2 997 P.2d 903 (per curiam), this
Court held that where a Utah court denies a petition for extraordinary writ in a
written opinion and it "is clear that the matter was decided on the merits," the
"petitioners are barred by the doctrine of res judicata from seeking the same relief
from another court in a subsequent action or petition. "Sound policy, principles of
judicial economy, and fairness to the parties require that final judgments on the
merits be subject only to proper appellate review and not to successive relitigation
in new courts." Id. ^3.
That is the case here. After extensive briefing—including submission of
affidavits and exhibits—and oral argument, this Court issued a thorough written
opinion "hold[ing] that the FLDS Association's claims regarding the district
court's modification of the Trust are barred by the equitable doctrine of laches."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, H1J24-25 & n.13 (citing Renn v. J7to/z State Bd of Pardons,
904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995)). In reaching this conclusion, this Court made

4

detailed factual and legal findings both with regard to plaintiffs "lack of
diligence" and the "injury [to third-parties] resulting from that lack of diligence."

i

Id. \21. In short, this Court found that Jeffs and the FLDS Association's members
made a strategic and conscious decision not to challenge the reformed Trust, and
numerous parties relied on the assumed validity of the reformed Trust. It is thus
clear that this Court dismissed the FLDS Association's Rule 65B petition not on
discretionary grounds, but because it concluded that it would be inequitable to
allow plaintiff to challenge the validity of the reformation of the Trust at this late
date.
ARGUMENT
As explained below, this Court's decision that a claim is barred by laches is
res judicata to all Utah state courts. And because Utah courts cannot relitigate a
laches determination made by this Court, under 28 U.S.C. §1738, federal district
courts may not either. See Carpenter v. Reed, 757 F.2d 218, 219 (10th Cir. 1985)
(federal courts are required to give res judicata effect to state judgment to the
extent state courts would give such effect).

25
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I.

THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA PROMOTES JUDICIAL
ECONOMY AND PROTECTS LITIGANTS FROM THE BURDEN
OF RELITIGATING A CLAIM WITH THE SAME PARTY.
The doctrine of res judicata has two related but distinct branches: claim

preclusion and issue preclusion. Mack, 2009 UT 47, \2% 221 P.3d 194. Claim
preclusion bars litigants from relitigating the same claims that were raised in a
prior action between the same parties that resulted in a final judgment "on the
merits." See, e.g., Macris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, f 19, 16 P.3d
1214; Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). Issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel) prevents parties or their
privies from relitigating, in a second suit raising different claims, "facts and issues"
that "were fully litigated in the first suit." Macris, 2000 UT 93,1fl9, 16 P.3d 1214
(quotations omitted); Copper State Thrift & Loan, 735 P.2d at 389.
Both branches, however, are "premised on the principle that a controversy
should be adjudicated only once." Mack, 2009 UT 47, f29, 221 P.3d 194 (quoting
Nebeker, 2001 UT 74,123, 34 P.3d 180). The doctrine of res judicata thus serves
"the important judicial policy" of "preventing issues once litigated from being
relitigated." Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah
1983). It protects litigants "from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with
the same party or his privy" and promotes "judicial economy by preventing
needless litigation." Smith, 793 P.2d at 409; see also Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 224
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000) ("The fundamental policies underlying the
doctrine of res judicata ... are finality, judicial economy, preventing repetitive
litigation and forum-shopping, and 'the interest in bringing litigation to an end.55').
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, res judicata means that "[o]nce
a party has fought out a matter in litigation with the other party, he cannot later
renew that duel;5 Comm V v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948).
H.

THE DISMISSAL OF A CLAIM ON GROUNDS OF LACHES IS A
DECISION "ON THE MERITS" FOR PURPOSES OF RES
JUDICATA EVEN THOUGH IT DOES NOT DECIDE THE
"ULTIMATE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES" OF THE CLAIM.
Although a judgment must be "on the 'merits'" to bar subsequent litigation

of the same claim between the same parties, it is a "misconception of res judicata
to assume that the doctrine does not come into operation if a court has not passed
on the 'merits' in the sense of the ultimate substantive issues of a litigation."
Angel, 330 U.S. at 190. Rather, "[a]n adjudication declining to reach such ultimate
substantive issues may bar a second attempt to reach them in another court of the
State," because the "'merits' of a claim are disposed of when they are refused
enforcement." Id.
Thus, if a court says to the plaintiff '"you are too late' or otherwise wraps up
a case in a way that indicates that the plaintiff has irrevocably failed," the decision
"may be 'on the merits' for purposes of preclusion even though the court did not
resolve the merits" of the plaintiffs underlying claim. Am. Nat'I Bank & Trust Co.
27
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v. City of Chic, 826 F.2d 1547, 1553 (7th Cir. 1987). For example, numerous state
and federal courts have held that the dismissal of a claim as barred by the statute of
limitations is a decision "on the merits" that bars relitigation of the claim in the
same system of courts.6 See, e.g., Murphy v. Klein Tools, Inc., 935 F.2d 1127,
1128-29 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (dismissal based on statute of limitations is
a judgment on the merits); Shoup v. Bell & Howell Co., 872 F.2d 1178, 1179 (4th
Cir. 1989) ("We hold that the federal district court's dismissal of plaintiffs'
Pennsylvania action on statute of limitations grounds is a final judgment on the
merits."); Rose v. Town of Harwich, 778 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.)
("our survey of recent cases suggests a clear trend toward giving claim-preclusive
effect to dismissals based on statutes of limitations") (citing cases); PRC Harris,
Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The longstanding rule in

6

If two jurisdictions each provide a cause of action for the same claim, but one
jurisdiction applies a longer statute of limitations than the other, the traditional rule
is that a dismissal of the claim barred by the shorter statute of limitations may not
bar the plaintiff from proceeding with the claim in the jurisdiction with the longer
statute of limitations. See, e.g., 18A Wright et al., supra, §4441. The rationale for
this rule is that a finding "that the action has been brought after the expiration of
the statutory period, and, as a matter of law, that remedy is barred" in the first
jurisdiction should not bind a court in the second jurisdiction that has decided, as a
matter of law, to provide a longer statute of limitations. See, e.g., Warner v.
Buffalo Drydock Co., 61 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1933). But that rule has no
application where, as here, "the second forum would decide independently to apply
the same statute of limitations as led to the first dismissal." 18A Wright et al.,
supra, §4441; cf Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 245-48 (1988) (§1983 adopts the
state statute of limitations for personal injury actions).
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this Circuit," is that "a dismissal for failure to comply with the statute of
limitations will operate as an adjudication on the merits . . . ."); Nathan vRowan,
651 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1981) (same); Myers v. Bull, 599 F.2d 863, 865 (8th
Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (same); Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186

i

F.2d 464, 466-67 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1950) (same); N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Bos.
Med. Grp., 906 A.2d 1042, 1052 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (our holding that a
statute of limitations dismissal is "an adjudication on the merits under the doctrine
of res judicata" is "consistent with the majority of state courts to have addressed
this issue") (citing cases); Smith v. Russell Sage Coll, 429 N.E.2d 746, 750 (N.Y.
1981) (even if statute of limitations is sometimes viewed as "procedural," a
dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is "sufficiently close to the merits for
claim preclusion purposes to bar a second action").

In short, "[t]he rules of

finality, both statutory and judge made, treat a dismissal on statute-of-limitations
grounds the same way they treat a dismissal for failure to state a claim, for failure
to prove substantive liability, or for failure to prosecute: as a judgment on the
merits." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995).7

7

In the Tenth Circuit, the FLDS Association opposed certification on the ground
that because it filed suit in federal court rather than state court, this Court's
dismissal of its claims on grounds of laches in Lindberg has no preclusive effect on
the federal litigation notwithstanding whether or not laches would be preclusive of
relitigation in Utah courts. Appellee's Mem. In Opp. to Motions to Certify at 1619, Doc. No. 01018736082 (10th Cir. Oct. 27, 2010). The Tenth Circuit implicitly
rejected this argument in certifying the question whether Utah courts accord
29
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In the criminal context, this Court has similarly stated that "collateral
estoppel prevents the government from bringing identical charges against a
defendant if the original charges were dismissed for violating the statute of
limitations." Cahoon, 2009 UT 9, fl4, 203 P.3d 957 (emphasis omitted) (citing
United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916)). In so doing, this Court
followed Oppenheimer, in which the United States Supreme Court applied civil
law principles of res judicata to the dismissal of an indictment on statute of
limitations grounds and held that "[a] plea of the statute of limitations is a plea to
the merits, and however the issue was raised in the former case, after judgment
upon it, it could not be reopened in a later prosecution." Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. at
87-88 (citation omitted). The Court reasoned that "the 5th Amendment was not
intended to do away with what in the civil law is a fundamental principle of justice
preclusive effect to a dismissal of a petition for extraordinary writ on grounds of
laches, and it was right to do so. The "full faith and credit" statute requires federal
courts to afford state court judgments the same "full faith and credit" they would
have "in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. §1738. Thus, if Lindberg would bar
the FLDS Association from relitigating its constitutional challenge to the
reformation of the Trust in Utah state court, it also bars the association's attempt to
relitigate the same constitutional claim in federal court. See, e.g., Jarrett v.
Gramling, 841 F.2d 354, 358 (10th Cir. 1988) (because Oklahoma state court
judgment in mandamus action barred plaintiff from bringing a separate §1983
action in state court, it also barred plaintiff from bringing the §1983 action in
federal court); DeVargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 1986)
(New Mexico state court judgment dismissing plaintiffs §1983 claims on grounds
of statute of limitations was "'on the merits' for res judicata purposes" and thus
bars plaintiffs attempt to raise same claims in §1983 action in federal court),
overruled on other grounds by Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1987).
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in order, when a man once has been acquitted on the merits, to enable the
government to prosecute him a second time." Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
Just as the dismissal of a claim on grounds of statute of limitations is a decision on
the merits that bars relitigation of the claim, the same rule applies "to a dismissal

i

on such analogous theories as laches or undue delay in initiating an administrative
proceeding." 18A Wright et al., supra, §4441. Thus, a number of federal and state
courts have recognized that a dismissal on the basis of laches is res judicata. See,
e.g., Smith v. City of Chic, 820 F.2d 916, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1987) ("'Dismissals
(

based on laches or the running of a statute of limitations preclude a second action
based on the same claim brought in the same system of courts.'"); Cannon v.
Loyola Univ. of Chic, 784 F.2d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[t]he disposition of

{

[constitutional] claims on grounds of laches is ". . . a judgment on the merits" for
purposes of res judicata); Murphy v. A/S Sobral, 187 F. Supp. 163, 164 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (holding that prior ruling dismissing claim on laches grounds was res
judicata); Day v. Estate ofWiswall
, 3 8 1 P.2d 217, 220 (Ariz. 1963) (according preclusive effect to a California
judgment rejecting a probate claim on the basis of laches); cf Paxton v. Ward, 199
F.3d 1197, 1206 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) (dismissal on the basis of laches is a
decision "on the merits" for purposes of statutory provision that habeas relief
generally may not be granted to a claim adjudicated "on the merits" in state court).
31
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Indeed, there are particularly compelling reasons for this Court to treat a
dismissal on grounds of laches as a decision "on the merits" for purposes of res
judicata.

To dismiss a claim on laches, the court must find that the plaintiff

showed a lack of diligence in bringing the claim, and the plaintiffs lack of
diligence harmed the defendants or third parties. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ^[27, 238
P.3d 1054; see also infra pp. 35-37. To hold this dismissal is not "on the merits"—
and thus the dilatory plaintiff may raise the claim in a second action
notwithstanding the harm that causes to others—would directly undermine the
interest in repose that the doctrine of laches is designed to protect. Cf. Rose, 778
F.2d at 81 (holding that a Massachusetts state court dismissal of an eminent
domain action on statute of limitations grounds is a decision "'on the merits'"
because allowing "a once-tardy plaintiff to bring a second action "would directly
undercut the policy underlying the limitations provision").
The federal district court in this case recognized "the essential fairness in the
view that at some point litigation over a particular controversy must come to an
end." Aplt.App.58. It nevertheless held that the dismissal of claims on grounds of
laches is "entitled to preclusive effect" only if the court making the laches finding
paid "appropriate attention" to the underlying merits of the claims. Aplt.App.60.
That holding finds no support in precedent or logic and should be rejected by this
Court.
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I

Although the district court correctly stated that the Arizona Supreme Court
in Day, 381 P.2d at 220, applied res judicata to a finding of laches made '"after a
consideration of the circumstances and merits of a suit,5" Aplt.App.60, it is clear
from the Day opinion that the laches decision was based not on the court's

i

evaluation of the "merits" of plaintiff s underlying claim of legal entitlement to a
portion of her stepmother's estate, but rather on the "merits" of the application of
the doctrine of laches to the particular facts of that case. See Day, 381 P.2d at 220
(noting that the prior court had entered a judgment that "plaintiff take nothing" by
i

reason of the doctrine of laches because the "separate and community interests"
she sought to reach had been "intermingled" over the years in which she had
delayed filing suit, and it "would now be inequitable to segregate and evaluate
such interests] separately")

(quotations omitted).

The decision is thus fully

consistent with the majority rule that a judgment holding claims barred by laches is
o

a "judgment on the merits" for purposes of res judicata.

Although there is language in Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, 5 P.3d 874, 884
(Cal. 2000), that a judgment on grounds of laches is not a judgment "on the merits"
for purposes of res judicata because the "defense of laches has nothing to do with
the merits of the cause against which it is asserted," the context in which that
statement was made is entirely distinguishable from the issues before this Court.
Johnson was an assistant city manager who alleged he was fired for opposing
sexual discrimination by another city employee. Id. at 877. After the city
personnel board rejected his grievance and found his job was eliminated for
economic reasons, he filed suit raising several causes of action. The California
Supreme Court held that Johnson's challenge to the personnel board decision was
barred by laches, so the board's finding that he was discharged for
33
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More fundamentally, if courts were to relax principles of res judicata
whenever they thought a litigant had a strong claim on the merits, the doctrine
"would fail to serve its purposes of promoting judicial economy and repose."
Rose, 778 F.2d at 82 (holding that a state court's dismissal of an eminent domain
action on statute of limitations grounds barred plaintiff from asserting the same
claim in federal court under the Taking Clause notwithstanding plaintiffs
argument that "he has a meritorious claim" and it is therefore "unfair to deny him
relief").

Even if a court might think "a fairer result might be achieved" in some

"individual instances," the "litigation of stale claims and the resulting uncertainty
would mean injustice or hardship" most of the time. Id. "For this reason, the
Supreme Court has instructed [courts] not to stray from traditional principles of res
judicata by making any 'ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case.'"
Id. (quotingFederatedDep'tStores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981)).

nondiscriminatory reasons was final under state law and binding on his claim
under the state Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. at 880, 884. But the
board's finding was not binding on Johnson's claim under Title VII of the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964, because under governing United States Supreme Court
precedent, "Title VII claims are not precluded by administrative decisions that
have not been judicially reviewed on their merits." Id. at 882. Because the court
held that Johnson's challenge to the personnel board findings were barred by
laches, it did not review the board's findings "on the merits" and thus its judgment
did not bar litigation of the Title VII claim. Id. at 884.
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III.

A UTAH COURT'S DENIAL OF A PETITION FOR
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT UNDER RULE 65B IS RES JUDICATA IF
IT AFFIRMATIVELY APPEARS THAT THE DENIAL WAS
INTENDED TO BE ON THE MERITS.
When this Court denies a petition for extraordinary writ under Rule 65B on
i

the merits, the denial of the writ is entitled to the same preclusive effect as the
disposition on the merits of any other case pending before the Court. Rule 65B of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits a person "to petition the court for

*

extraordinary relief if "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available."
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). The court may grant the petitioner any of the remedies

^

that were available under the common law writs, such as certiorari, mandamus, quo
warranto, prohibition, or habeas corpus.

Reriri, 904 P.2d at 682-83 & n.3.
i

Although the decision whether to grant relief on a Rule 65B petition is "left to the
sound discretion of the court hearing the petition," Barrett, 2005 UT 127, ^[23,
i

P.3d 682, it is "well settled that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to
judgments in mandamus and prohibition proceedings," 21 A.L.R. 3d 206, §2. In
other words, "the special character of these proceedings does not, ipso facto,

(

preclude a judgment rendered therein from operating as res judicata in another
action or proceeding." Id. "All that is required is careful attention to the nature of
the initial proceeding and the basis of decision." 18A Wright, Miller, et al., supra,
§4445.

35
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If the court denies a Rule 65B petition without opinion under circumstances
that are "consistent with the view [that the] court merely refused to exercise its
original jurisdiction, or . . . was of the opinion [that] an extraordinary writ was not
a proper remedy," the denial of the writ is "not res judicata" and does not bar the
petitioner's attempt to litigate the issues in a subsequent action. Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 575 P.2d 705, 708 (Utah 1978); see also 21 A.L.R. 3d
206, § 18 ("In a number of cases the courts have held or recognized the rule to the
effect that a judgment denying a writ of prohibition without written opinion is not
res judicata unless the sole possible ground of the denial was that the court acted
on the merits, or unless it affirmatively appears that such denial was intended to be
on the merits.").
If, however, a court denies a petition for extraordinary writ on the merits,
then "a right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue" in the petition and "directly
determined" by the court "cannot be disputed in subsequent actions between the
same parties or their privies." Meagher Cnty. Newlan Creek Water Dist. v. Walter,
547 P.2d 850, 853 (Mont. 1976); see also, e.g., Ramirez-Pabon v. Bd. of
Personnel, 254 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1958) (it is "a clearly correct application of the
settled doctrine of res judicata" to hold that a "plaintiff cannot maintain a second
suit on the same cause of action" when the question was presented to the court in a
mandamus petition and "decided against her" on the merits); City of Elmhurst v.
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Kegerreis, 64 N.E.2d 450, 455 (111. 1945) (where the "question was determined in
the mandamus suit adversely to the contention of the appellant in this suit/' res
judicata prevents it from being relitigated in a subsequent proceeding); State ex rel
Hamilton v. Cohn, 95 P.2d 38, 41 (Wash. 1939) ("an adjudication made in a
mandamus proceeding would bar a new proceeding under the same rule that would
apply when a judgment of a court of record is set up as a bar to a new suit or
action").
Utah courts follow this rule as well. In Gates v. Taylor, 2000 UT 33, ffifl-2,
997 P.2d 903, this Court held that where a Utah court denies a petition for
extraordinary writ in a written opinion that, "is clear that the matter was decided on
the merits," the "petitioners are barred by the doctrine of res judicata from seeking
the same relief from another court in a subsequent petition.

"Sound policy,

principles of judicial economy, and fairness to the parties require that final
judgments on the merits be subject only to proper appellate review and not to
successive relitigation in new courts." Id. ^3; see also Burleigh v. Turner, 388
P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1964) (denial of a Rule 65B petition for writ of habeas corpus
"is res judicata as to [a] subsequent proceeding" for habeas corpus relief). "When
a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated directly upon a particular matter,
the same point is not open to inquiry in a subsequent action for the same cause and

37
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between the same parties." Gates, 2000 UT 33, f3, 997 P.2d 903 (alterations and
quotations omitted).
IV.

BECAUSE THIS COURT HELD THAT THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S
CHALLENGE TO THE MODIFICATION OF THE UEP TRUST IS
BARRED BY LACHES, THE DISMISSAL OF THE RULE 65B
PETITION IS A DECISION ON THE MERITS THAT IS RES
JUDICATA IN A SUBSEQUENT ACTION.
As noted, in Lindberg, after extensive briefing (including submission of

affidavits and exhibits) and argument, this Court adjudicated directly upon the
question whether the FLDS Association's challenge to the modification of the UEP
Trust is barred by laches. In a detailed and thorough 45 paragraph written opinion,
this Court dismissed the FLDS Association's petition, "hold[ing] that the FLDS
Association's claims regarding the district court's modification of the Trust are
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches." Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, Hf24-25 &
n.13, 238 P.3d 1054 (quoting Renn, 904 P.2d at 684).
In so holding the FLDS Association's claims barred by laches, this Court
applied the same laches test that is applicable to claims commenced in Utah courts
under other jurisdictional grants. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51,fflf27-29,238 P.3d 1054
(citing Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (action
filed in district court by orthodontist to recover against bank for wrongful
acceptance of patients' checks bearing forged endorsements), and Papanikolas
Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah
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1975) (action filed in district court to enforce a restrictive covenant)). That laches
test "has two elements: (1) a party's lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting
from that lack of diligence." Lindberg, 2010 UT 51,1f27, 238 P.3d 1054.
With respect to the first element, the Court found that "the FLDS

i

Association has demonstrated a lack of diligence in filing this petition" because it
delayed filing suit for three years, "despite assurances by the [district] court that
participation" in the litigation to modify the Trust "was welcome." Id. ffi|30, 32.
Furthermore, "this delay did not occur under circumstances that might excuse it,
i

such as prompt negotiations aimed at avoiding litigation," as occurred in
Paponikolas Bros. Id. ^32.
The Court also found the second element of the laches test met because the
"lack of diligence has caused injury to those who relied on the Trust's modification
during the FLDS Association's delay." Id. ^33. Specifically, the Special Fiduciary

i

"has made choices over the years, many expressly approved by Judge Lindberg,
that cannot be undone." Id. (quotations omitted).

"Other interested persons,

including Trust Participants who are not members of the Petitioner association,
have also made irreversible decisions and changed their positions based on [the]
i

unappealed and heretofore unchallenged final orders" of the district court. Id.
(quotations omitted). Finally, the FLDS Association's delay in filing the petition
injured the "Original Interested Individuals, whose looming default judgments led
39
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to the district court's reformation of the Trust." Id. f34. The FLDS Association's
delay "caused the Individuals to change positions on their own claims," and any
relief "granted the FLDS Association would operate against the interests of the
Original Interested Individuals." Id. Because both prongs of the laches test were
met, this Court "dismissed] the FLDS Association's Trust modification claims
pursuant to the doctrine of laches." Id. ^[35.
In sum, it is clear from the Court's opinion that the FLDS Association's
challenge to the reformation of the UEP Trust was dismissed because it is barred
by laches, and not because the Court declined to exercise its discretion to grant
relief under Rule 65B. The Court's laches finding is therefore res judicata and bars
the FLDS Association's attempt to relitigate its challenge to the reformation of the
Trust in a subsequent action.10

9

Because the Court held that the FLDS Association's claims are barred by laches,
it "decline[d] to reach the merits of [the Association's] claims." Lindberg, 2010
UT 51, f43, 238 P.3d 1054. As noted above, however, a decision dismissing a
claim on grounds of laches (like a finding that a claim is barred by the statute of
limitations) is a decision "on the merits" for purposes of res judicata, even though
it does not address the "merits" of the plaintiffs underlying claim. See supra
Section III.
Of course, this does not mean that Lindberg categorically precludes the FLDS
Association from raising any claim related to administration of the Trust. This
Court's decision made clear that while the FLDS Association may not challenge
the reformation of the Trust, its claims that certain Trust beneficiaries may be
denied a share of Trust property based on their religious beliefs are not barred by
laches. Although this Court held that these claims were not ripe because such
conduct had not occurred, plaintiff may raise them if the Trust property is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should confirm that under Utah law, dismissal of a petition for an
extraordinary writ on grounds of laches in a written opinion is a decision "on the
merits" such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred. Accordingly, this

(

Court should further confirm that its decision in Fundamentalist Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054, was on the
i

merits and that no party or privity of any party can relitigate any claim that was or
could have been raised in that matter.
RULE 24(a)(ll) STATEMENT
No addendum is necessary under Rule 24(a)(ll) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

distributed in the future in an unconstitutional manner. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ^f
39-40, 238 P.3d 1054.
41
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